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POLffiCAL CONSENSUS, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FORMULAE, AND THE RATIONALE FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Martin H. Redish* 
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW. By Robert Nagel Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press. 1989. Pp. xii, 232. $27.50. 
Although the theory of judicial review has received a great deal of 
scholarly attention in recent years, much of it has articulated, in vary-
ing degrees, a so-called activist approach to constitutional law. Many 
of those writing on the subject have urged an extremely expansive role 
for the judiciary in matters of moral choice and social policy, 1 often in 
disregard of constitutional text or history.2 
One of the leading counterexamples is Professor Robert Nagel, 
who, along with several pthers, 3 has long been identified as a resister of 
extensive judicial involvement in the process of social choice through 
the vehicle of constitutional analysis. In his book, Constitutional Cul-
tures: The Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review, Nagel syn-
thesizes his previous work4 into a coherent statement of his philosophy 
of judicial review. As such, the book stands as an articulate statement 
of a modem "conservative" approach to the issue of judicial review. 
In the unlikely event that anyone questioned the fact previously, 
this book removes any doubt that Nagel is an important force in mod-
em constitutional theory. But it is perhaps for that very reason that I 
find the book so deeply troubling. Of course, in light of my own 
largely "activist" bent, 5 to a certain extent my disagreement with 
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B. 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 
1970, Harvard Law School. - Ed. The author would like to thank Ronald Allen and Gary 
Lawson for their valuable comments. Portions of this essay will appear in Professor Redish's 
forthcoming book, THE FEDERAL CoURTS IN THE PoLmCAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION 
AND AMERICAN PoLmCAL THEORY, to be published by Carolina Academic Press. 
1. See, e.g., M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); 
Brest, The Misconceived Quest far the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); 
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
2. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note l; Brest, supra note 1; Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 
TEXAS L. REV. 373 (1982). 
3. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); R. BORK, THE TEMPTING 
OF AMERICA (1989); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981). 
4. The book consists of essays Nagel has published previously elsewhere. P. xi. 
5. See, e.g., Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982). 
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Nagel's analysis should come as no surprise. But my problems with 
his theory go considerably deeper than a simple difference in ideologi-
cal outlook. For one thing, I find Nagel's analysis lacking in princi-
pled consistency. 6 I have often found myself in substantial conflict 
with those scholars of a political bent similar to my own, who have 
called either for a sweeping judicial power to ignore textual limitations 
in invalidating majoritarian action7 or for an abdication of judicial re-
view when the asserted constitutional challenge derives from a provi-
sion not in ideological favor. 8 I have differed with these theorists, 
because I believe that while considerations of ideology cannot and 
should not be totally excluded from constitutional analysis, American 
political theory precludes them from being the sole factor. The un-
representativeness of the judiciary dictates severe limitations of princi-
ple on the nature of the decision-making process.9 One might expect 
that an advocate of judicial restraint would share the same concern. 
However, close comparison of different chapters µi Nagel's book 
reveals an ideological bias just as unprincipled as that manifested by 
those at the other end of the ideological spectrum.10 
More fundamentally, I am troubled by what I consider to be 
Nagel's insensitivity to fundamental precepts of American political 
theory, and to the Supreme Court's role in that theory. 11 The percep-
tion of the normative ideal of the American political structure by 
which Nagel appears to measure the validity of modem judicial re-
view12 is very different from my understanding of the political values 
American society is designed to foster. 13 Similarly, I find his charac-
terization of the ideal performance of the judicial craft to be dramati-
cally different from my own perceptions.14 In the remainder of this 
review, I will explain my understanding of Nagel's approa~h to these 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 100-13. 
7. See M. PERRY, supra note l; Brest, supra note 1; Levinson, supra note 2. 
8. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLmCAL PROCESS 
(1980); see infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. 
9. See Redish & Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role of Textual 
Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1987); Redish, The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and 
the Importance of Analyzing Legal Doctrine, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1378, 1399-401 (1985). 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 100-13. 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 26-31. 
12. I say "appears to measure" because at no point does Nagel attempt to posit a coherent 
vision of American political or constitutional theory. Hence, one can derive his views on such 
questions only by the process of "reverse engineering" - inferring his underlying normative 
theoretical precepts from his conclusions on narrower issues. 
In part, this problem may derive from the fact that the book represents a synthesis of previ-
ously published articles, each of which focused on a specific application of judicial review theory. 
However, the book's failure to include one or more detailed chapters (beyond the minimal five-
page introduction) providing an underlying theoretical overview and linking his somewhat nar-
rower discussions is a serious structural defect. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 29-30. 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 122-25. 
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two issues, and how I believe this approach differs from the norma-
tively correct analysis of those issues. 
I. NAGEL'S "CONFRONTATION" MODEL AND HIS CURIOUS CALL 
FOR CONSENSUS 
Nagel undertakes his critique of the modem practice of judicial 
review by "recommending that the idea of judicial restraint be reexam-
ined and reemphasized" and postulating that "[t]he essence of re-
straint is the admission that the Constitution does not apply to many 
public issues or, at least, that it does not apply in any determinative 
way" (p. 25): He concludes "that an unchecked urge to enforce [con-
stitutional] norms through adjudication may in fact undermine the ca-
pacity for durable constitutional government" (p. 25). 
Nagel reaches this conclusion first by pointing to the many 
"uninterpreted provisions" of the Constitution, over which there has 
traditionally arisen little controversy and which rarely have been the 
subject of judicial scrutiny.15 He then infers that there has been little 
controversy over these provisions because they have rarely been the 
subject of judicial scrutiny.16 The apparent implication of his logic is 
that if the courts had simply avoided interpreting such provisions as 
the due process and equal protection clauses, we would have devel-
oped a similar consensus about the meaning of those provisions. The 
obvious fallacy in Nagel's logic is that he has confused cause and ef-
fect. Controversy over the meaning of constitutional provisions does 
not arise because the courts have interpreted them; the courts have 
interpreted these provisions because real-life controversy exists about 
their meaning. Courts, after all, do not go out seeking cases to decide. 
In the first instance, at least, they function as passive institutions; cases 
are brought to them.17 Indeed, this is one important sense in which 
courts are distinguished from legislatures. When there is no contro-
versy over the meaning of a constitutional provision, there is presuma-
bly no reason to bring the question of the provision's meaning to 
court. 
The point is underscored by comparison of the provisions which 
have not been adjudicated by the courts with those that have been. 
While the former category includes such provisions as the age require-
15. Seep. 14: "[A]Ithough much scholarly and popular attention is focused on the complexi-
ties and surprises of constitutional interpretation, much of the constitutional order is consistently 
realized and desired from practice." 
16. He suggests that "[p]erhaps uninterpreted meaning is both obvious and reflectively sta· 
ble, not because of the special characteristics of certain provisions, but because of the special 
capacity of practice to sustain effective consensus." P. 17; see also pp. 19-22, 25. 
17. See U.S. CoNST. art. III,§ 2 (extending the judicial power only to "Cases" or "Contro-
versies"). See generally Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). 
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ment for the presidency18 and the four-year presidential term, 19 the 
latter category includes the first amendment right of free speech,20 the 
due process clause,21 and the equal protection clause.22 A casual ex-
amination reveals that both the language and purposes of the provi-
sions not reviewed by the courts are considerably less ambiguous than 
those that have been.23 Even to the extent that the former provisions 
might be thought in some sense to be ambiguous (p. 15), they have not 
been the subject of interpretation largely because no real-life, signifi-
cant dispute about their meaning has arisen. For example, Professor 
Tushnet may easily posit the hypothetical of a sixteen-year-old guru 
seeking the presidency who claims that he is in reality thousands of 
years old due to numerous reincarnations, 24 but the fact remains that 
there have been few, if any, serious challengers for the Presidency 
under the age of thirty-five. Similarly, while Nagel may suggest the 
possibility of argument about the definition of a four-year presidential 
term (p. 15), no real-life controversy over the meaning of that concept 
has ever developed. 
Thus, Nagel lacks either logical or empirical support when he as-
serts that "practice has important and unappreciated advantages over 
interpretation for sustaining the sense of sh~ed agreement that can 
eventually make a particular meaning seem plain or inevitable" (p. 
18). He has presented no data to counter the reasonable intuition that 
courts do not interpret certain provisions because there exists a sense 
of shared meaning about them, rather than that a sense of shared 
meaning exists about those provisions because the courts have not in-
terpreted them. 
Nagel actually seems to be accusing the process of judicial inter-
pretation of doing more harm than merely undermining the linguistic 
consensus that would otherwise exist. He also suggests that this pro-
cess tends to undermine the attainment of social and political consen-
sus, as well. While he believes that "[t]he limited, indefinite quality of 
informal meaning increases the likelihood that stable practices can de-
velop" (p. 18), he contends that 
U]egal meaning, on the other hand, is verbal meaning. It is formalized in 
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
20. U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
21. U.S. CoNST. amend. V; U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. 
22. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. 
23. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CoNST. amend. I. The due process clauses prohibits 
state and federal governments from depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property without due 
process oflaw. In contrast, article II provides that the President "shall hold his Office during the 
Term of four Years," and that no person is eligible for the post "who shall not have attained the 
age of thirty five Years .... " U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, els. 1 & 4. 
24. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 683, 686-88 (1985). 
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written opinions, specified in holdings, and systematized in explanatory 
doctrines. Losers are identified and suffer reduced stature. . . . Every 
decision provokes a new argument, as those who stand to lose attempt to 
reverse or narrow its scope. [p. 19] 
As empirical support for this assertion, Nagel points to the Court's 
decision recognizing a constitutional right to abortion,25 which, hear-
gues, "fiercely embittered the losers and raised the controversy to new 
levels of visibility" (p. 19). He concludes that "[s]table meaning does 
not easily become established at such levels of visibility and contro-
versy" (p. 19). 
Perhaps as well as any, the abortion example underscores Nagel's 
reversal of cause and effect. Does Nagel really intend to suggest that, 
but for the Supreme Court's involvement in the issue, there would 
have been no visible controversy over the abortion question? To the 
contrary, it was for the very reason that both sides felt so strongly 
about the issue that the question reached the judiciary in the first 
place. Ironically, it is probable that the Court's decision in Roe v. 
Wade actually prevented more widespread and intense public contro-
versy on the question, since that decision largely removed the abortion 
issue from the battlegrounds of fifty state legislatures and Congress, at 
least temporarily. 
The most troubling aspect of Nagel's analysis - in addition to his 
lack of empirical support and his apparent inversion of cause and ef-
fect - is his assumption that judicial action that undermines social, 
political, or textual consensus is somehow harmful. He asserts that 
"[i]f constitutional meaning is to be durable, it must seem to be plain 
to those who are governed by it" (p. 17). Therefore, "practice has 
important and unappreciated advantages over interpretation for sus-
taining the sense of shared agreement that can eventually make a par-
ticular meaning seem plain or inevitable" (p. 18). He often expresses 
fear about "destabiliz[ing] consensus" (p. 19), and seems to place great 
value on maintaining "the social consensus that permits durable, 
'plain' meaning."26 This fear leads him to conclude "that the judiciary 
ought not be in constant confrontation with society" (pp. 22-23). His 
concern about the costs of "the confrontation model" (p. 23) and of "a 
routinely pugnacious judiciary" (p. 23) leads him to conclude that 
[m]uch of the conflict, resistance, and instability that is evidenced in 
modem constitutional litigation is simply a predictable consequence of 
overemphasis on interpretation as the exclusive source of constitutional 
meaning. Stable realization of constitutional principles depends upon 
preserving the kind of tacit agreement that interpretation itself tends to 
break down. [p. 23] 
25. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
26. P. 21; see also p. 22 (contending that "many of the attributes of judicial interpretation 
that most suggest stability and consistency ..• in fact work to make disagreement and instability 
the norm"). 
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For all of these reasons, Nagel concludes "that judicial deference is 
an appropriate way to sustain the constitutional system" (p. 25). One 
could debate the extent to which judicial deference in constitutional 
adjudication is or is not advisable,27 But the most puzzling aspect of 
Nagel's argument for such deference is his concern about what he 
finds to be the negative effect of the lack of such deference on some 
broad notion of societal consensus. It is true, of course, that no society 
can function if its citizens are constantly on the verge of civil war. But 
Nagel does not appear to have suggested - nor reasonably could he 
- that even at the height of judicial activism such has been the case in 
American society. The most he could be referring to, then, is the kind 
of strong political divisions that have accompanied the abortion de-
bates. He appears to assume - so far as I can discern, without ever 
attempting first to put forth a coherent normative vision of American 
political theory - that the existence of such divisions is somehow evil 
or harmful. 
Perhaps if one were to begin with the premises of the "civic repub-
lican" scholars that there exists an objectively ascertainable "common 
good," and that citizens should be encouraged to eschew what they 
perceive to be their own individual private interests in favor of the 
pursuit of this communitarian end,28 then one might share Nagel's 
concerns about the existence of deep political or social divisions in 
American society. But as I have argued in more detail elsewhere,29 
such a view of American political theory dangerously ignores the basic 
premise of democratic thought that it is the individual members of 
society, rather than some external force, who are to determine what 
course of action is wisest. One who recognizes the important norma-
tive role that individuality and pluralism are designed to play in 
American democratic theory30 would not fear the existence of even 
widespread political or social divisions. Nor would she be comforted 
by attainment of some stultifying, widespread political consensus of 
the type Nagel appears to desire. 
An even more troubling mischaracterization of American political 
theory on Nagel's part is his disregard for the role which judicial re-
view is designed to play in it. Thus, even if Nagel were correct in 
asserting that the widespread exercise of judicial review causes the un-
27. It is my position that the extreme judicial deference urged by Nagel is wholly inconsistent 
with the important countermajoritarian element of American constitutional democratic theory. 
See infra Part III. 
28. See Siegal, The Marshall Court and Republicanism (Book Review), 67 TExAs L. REv. 
903, 916 (1989); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31-32 
(1985). 
29. See Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An 
''Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 761 (1989). 
30. See, e.g., Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 127 (S. Hampshire 
ed. 1978). 
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dermining of consensus, and even if he were correct in his contention 
that the absence of such consensus is necessarily harmful to our socie-
tal fabric, his conclusion that judicial review should be dramatically 
curtailed would ignore the substantial systemic costs of such a result. 
The next section will explore what I deem to be the appropriate ration-
ale for the exercise of judicial review in American political theory - a 
rationale seemingly ignored by Nagel. Following that discussion, I 
will illustrate how Nagel's conclusion dangerously threatens that role 
by examining the application of his theory to the issue of free speech. 
II. THE "COUNTERMAJORITARIAN" PRINCIPLE AND THE 
RATIONALE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
No one could seriously doubt that our system is far from a total or 
unlimited representative democracy. A carefully crafted, relatively de-
tailed written constitution defines and limits the powers of the repre-
sentative branches of government. This document, which established 
the organization and structure of our modem political system and 
continues to provide the legitimizing source of our govemment:·is 
framed in a mandatory, rather than an advisory form, and provides for 
alteration only through resort to a difficult, formalized process requir-
ing the consent of a substantial supermajority. Both practically and 
theoretically, then, the Constitution provides countermajoritarian (at 
least counter-simple majoritarian) ljmitations on democratic 
government. 
For much the same reason that the judiciary should evince defer-
ence to the policy choices of the representative branches when those 
choices go constitutionally unchallenged, the courts must possess au-
thority to adjudicate constitutional challenges to the actions of those 
branches. This, in short, describes what might reasonably be called 
the "countermajoritarian" principle. 
Like Nagel, however, a number of respected scholars over the 
years have appeared to miss this basic point. "The root difficulty," 
Alexander Bickel wrote, "is that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system."31 To put the point in its simplest 
form, Bickel argued that "when the Supreme Court declares unconsti-
tutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it 
thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and 
now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but 
against it. " 32 That, Bickel noted, "is the reason the charge can be 
made that judicial review is undemocratic."33 To be sure, Bickel ulti-
mately accepted some form of the principle of judicial review.34 But 
31. A. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 16. 
32. Id. at 16-17. 
33. Id. at 17. 
34. See id. at 23-28. 
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both Bickel's substantive constitutional analysis and his proposed ju-
risdictional structure appear to have been substantially influenced by 
what he called "the essential reality that judicial review is a deviant 
institution in the American democracy,"35 based on the assumption 
that "[j]udicial review works counter to" the "distinguishing charac-
teristic" of a democratic system - "the policy-making power of repre-
sentative institutions, born of the electoral process."36 
When policy issues are not claimed to be controlled by the Consti-
tution, Bickel's concern about the undemocratic character of judicial 
action is most certainly a legitimate one. 37 But it is both puzzling and 
disturbing that Bickel could seriously raise these concerns in the con-
text of constitutional adjudication. The doubts Bickel raised about the 
democratic character of the federal courts38 effectively beg the ques-
tion when raised in the constitutional context. For by its nature the 
Constitution is unambiguously not a democratic document. While of 
course its content ordains and establishes a form of representative de-
mocracy, the limitations it imposes on the authority of the various 
branches are profoundly undemocratic. 
If those who created our political system had intended an unfet-
tered majoritarian system, they could easily have adopted a governing 
document that did nothing more than establish the procedural mecha-
nisms for the operation of such a structure. In that case, the only 
policy choice removed from the will of a simple majority would have 
been the very fact of majority rule itself. Alternatively, they could 
simply have chosen not to adopt any single governing document at all, 
and instead allow the government to function on the basis of accepted 
tradition and periodic written edicts of fundamental values - much as 
the British system has. 
Those who founded our system chose neither of these courses. 
While they wisely declined to adopt a highly detailed and extended 
code in a manner that would have been disturbingly similar to today's 
Internal Revenue Code, they did adopt a governing document that 
went considerably beyond either a simple declaration of basic values 
or a mere procedural structure designed to ensure majority rule. The 
Constitution provides a moderately detailed political blueprint, estab-
lishing both the mechanics of day-to-day governmental operation and 
the boundaries inside of which that government and its particular 
branches are to exercise power. We may debate the exact motivations 
for the various structural and political limitations imposed by the doc-
ument. But two key points are beyond dispute: (1) these limitations 
- whether on the structure of the federal government, on the scope of 
35. Id. at 18. 
36. Id. at 19. 
37. See Redish, supra note 29, at 762-64. 
38. See supra text accompanying notes 31-36. 
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its powers, or on its authority to restrict individual liberty - are 
framed in mandatory, rather than advisory terminology, and (2) they 
are all subject to the stringent, supermajoritarian protections of article 
V's amendment process. Thus, there can be no doubt that by its terms 
the Constitution imposes substantial limitations on the outer reaches 
of the governmental power which it created, and that those limitations 
were placed beyond the power of a simple majority to modify or re-
peal. In its essence, then, the Constitution is very much a counter-
majoritarian document. 
It is, therefore, nonsensical to attack judicial review, as Bickel and 
others have done, as "counter-majoritarian" or as a "deviant" element 
within a democratic society.39 Democratic theorists have made clear 
that a limited (or "constitutional") form of democracy is no less prop-
erly classified as "democratic" merely because it is limited. 40 In point 
of fact, historians agree that many of those who formulated the Con-
stitution were far from radical democrats.41 While they obviously 
chose as their underlying political value a concept of fundamental pop-
ular sovereignty and self-determination - the necessary condition of 
any democratic system42 - they often expressed concern over the 
dangers of unlimited democracy.43 More importantly, there can be 
little doubt that the political system they embodied in the Constitution 
- with its delicate structure of checks and balances,44 its imposition 
of numerous hurdles to the enactment of legislation,45 its dilutions of a 
39. See A. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 16 ("The root difficulty is that judicial review is a 
counter-majoritarian force in our system."); cf Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term -
Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 46 (1989) ("For several decades, 
the scholarly literature about judicial review has been dominated by ... a conviction that judicial 
review is a deviant institution in a democratic society."). 
40. See J. PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 307-08 (1979) ("[C]onstitutionalism 
provides a useful, if not an essential, framework and set of constraints for the operation of social 
pluralism for democratic ends."). Because the Constitution is subject to amendment by a super-
majoritarian process, a constitutional democracy effectively imposes what Pennock calls a "quali-
fied majority" rule for those issues resolved by the Constitution. Such issues are those about 
which "the (generic) rational individual at the constitution-making stage would feel that the 
chances for relatively high external costs from such action were great. Accordingly, he would 
favor a restrictive voting rule (qualified majority) for [those] subject[s]." Id. at 394-95 (footnote 
omitted); see also D. HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 65 (1987). According to Held, "The 
'tyranny of the majority,' as it has often been called, can only be forestalled by particular consti-
tutional arrangements." Id. at 64. 
41. According to one historian, the framers were concerned with avoiding "a democratic 
despotism." R. WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 12 (1984). As Madison argued 
in The Federalist No. 10, "instability, injustice, and confusion ... have ••. been the mortal 
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished .•.. "THE FEDERALIST 
No. 10, at 104 (Madison) (J. Hamilton ed. 1868). He noted that pure democracies "have, in 
general, been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths." Id. at 109; see also 
D. HELD, supra note 40, at 61-62. 
42. See J. PENNOCK, supra note 40, at 7-8; D. HELD, supra note 40, at 2. 
43. See supra note 41. 
44. See U.S. CoNST. arts. I, II & III. 
45. These include primarily the Constitution's requirements of bicameralism, U.S. CONST. 
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direct representational system, 46 its formal insulation of the judiciary 
from majoritarian pressures, 47 and, jn the Bill of Rights, its creation of 
extensive enclaves of individual liberty protected from governmental 
invasion48 - was far from either a pure democracy or a system of 
simple majoritarianism. 
Ironically, in developing his own rationale for judicial review in 
light of the straw man of a mythical pure American democracy, Bickel 
himself seriously endangered the very majoritarian values he initially 
exalted. Bickel rightly began his analysis with a 
search ... for a function which might (indeed, must) involve the making 
of policy, yet which differs from the legislative and executive functions; 
. . . which will not likely be performed elsewhere if the courts do not 
assume it ... and whose discharge by the courts will not lower the qual-
ity of the other departments' performance by denuding them of the dig-
nity and burden of their own responsibility.49 
His answer was that "courts have certain capacities for dealing with 
matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess."50 
Thus, according to Bickel, to the extent that an issue may be decided 
on the basis of "principle" - in other words, by means of an analysis 
of long-range values51 - it is appropriate for final judicial resolution, 
despite the inherent tensions between judicial review and democratic 
theory. At no point, however, does Bickel appear to limit this judicial 
authority to the expounding of principles and values gleaned from the 
text, structure, or history of the Constitution. Since in a constitutional 
democracy the only justification for judicial review by an unrepresent-
ative governmental organ is to ensure that the majoritarian branches 
adhere to the countermajoritarian limitations imposed by the Consti-
tution, judicial invalidation of the exercise of majoritarian will on any 
other grounds erodes fundamental democratic principles. Yet, be-
cause of his unwarranted concern over the "deviant" nature of judicial 
review as an element of American democratic theory, Bickel would 
have significantly confined the judiciary's jurisdictional and substan-
tive power in constitutional cases. Thus, Bickel's approach to judicial 
review somehow manages to be simultaneously over- and 
underinclusive. 
art. I, §§ 1, 7, and presentment, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, els. 2 & 3. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919 (1983). 
46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing for selection of senators by the state legislatures, 
later altered by the seventeenth amendment to provide for direct senatorial election). 
47. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1. 
48. U.S. CONST. amends. 1-X. 
49. A. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 24. 
50. Id. at 25. 
51. See id. at 24: "[M]any actions of government have two aspects: their immediate, neces-
sarily intended, practical effects, and their perhaps unintended or unappreciated bearing on val-
ues we hold to have more general and permanent interest." 
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The fact that judicial review may not be inherently inconsistent 
with American political theory does not, of course, necessarily estab-
lish that the absence of judicial review is necessarily inconsistent with 
our prevailing political precepts. In other words, the fact that we logi-
cally can vest in the judiciary the final say as to the Constitution's 
meaning does not mean that we logically must vest such authority in 
the courts. Bickel, for example, raised the possibility that each branch 
be deemed the final arbiter of the meaning of the constitutional provi-
sions governing its behavior. 52 William Van Alstyne, in critiquing 
John Marshall's reasoning in Marbury v. Madison, 53 argued: 
That the Constitution is a "written" one yields little or nothing as to 
whether acts of Congress may be given the force of positive law notwith-
standing the opinions of judges, the executive, a minority or majority of 
the population, or even of Congress itself ... that such Acts are repug-
nant to the Constitution. That this is so is clear enough simply from the 
fact that even in Marshall's time (and to a great extent today), a number 
of nations maintained written constitutions and yet gave national legisla-
tive acts the full force of positive law without providing any constitu-
tional check to guarantee the compatibility of those acts with their 
constitutions. 54 
Close analysis demonstrates, however, that both Bickel's suggestion 
and Van Alstyne's critique are wrong. We could not, as Bickel sug-
gests, logically vest in each branch the final say as to the meaning of 
the constitutional provisions governing their authority, at least if we 
still intend to maintain a meaningful constitutional system. Nor is 
Van Alstyne's argument that judicial review is not logically inherent in 
a constitutional system, because other nations possessing written con-
stitutions fail to provide for judicial review, dispositive of anything. 
No one, to my knowledge, has ever suggested that judicial review is a 
physical necessity of a constitutional system, only that it is a logical or 
practical necessity. That other nations decline to provide for judicial 
review at most establishes the former proposition; it says absolutely 
nothing about the latter. To the extent other nations with written con-
stitutions fail to adopt a system of judicial review, they could simply 
be wrong - at least to the extent those nations desire a meaningful 
constitutional system. Certainly, since the time of the framers, our 
nation, in shaping its governmental structure, has never considered 
itself logically or normatively bound by the practices of other nations. 
In any event, many nations governed by a written constitution have, in 
fact, erected detailed systems of judicial review. 55 
52. Id. at 7. 
53. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
54. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (footnote 
omitted). 
55. See J. BARRON, c. DIENES, W. McCoRMACK & M. REDISH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 13-15 {3d ed. 1987); see also Lobel, The Meaning of Democracy: Repre-
sentations and Participatory Democracy in the New Nicaraguan Constitution, 49 U. P1rr. L. REV. 
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A system that adopts an unwritten constitution is placing ultimate 
confidence in those in political power to act in good faith. Because 
both the existence and meaning of unwritten traditions are so uncer-
tain, it would not be difficult for political leaders to argue persuasively 
that no such applicable tradition actually exists. Moreover, even a 
well-established tradition could be abandoned, as long as a simple ma-
jority chose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that a system 
premised on an unwritten constitution would necessarily degenerate 
into a political state of nature, but only that the system could not rea-
sonably be deemed to be governed by a countermajoritarian 
constitution. 
When a constitution assumes a written form, however, those estab-
lishing the government are manifesting considerably less trust of those 
who will exercise political power. This is particularly so when the 
constitution - as is true of ours - speaks in mandatory terms. It is 
even more true when that constitution - again, as does ours - in 
both its history and text openly manifests profound mistrust of those 
in power. 56 This mistrust, it should be noted, extends well beyond the 
political leaders themselves. Those who drafted our Constitution 
often expressed serious concern over the power of the electorate that 
puts those leaders in power.57 That our Constitution was not struc-
tured merely as a means of protecting the interests of the electorate 
from abuse by those in power can be seen in article V's provision for 
constitutional amendment. If the sole goal of our constitution were to 
protect popular interests against governmental excess, then presuma-
bly amendments could have been authorized by a vote of a simple ma-
jority of the electorate. Instead, the framers adopted an amendatory 
structure under which it is possible that both political leaders and a 
simple majority of the electorate might desire to repeal or change a 
constitutional dictate, but would nevertheless be deprived of the legal 
authority to do so. 
In light of these considerations, let us examine Bickel's suggestion 
(one to which he was not necessarily committing himself, it should be 
noted)58 that each branch retain final say as to the meaning of the 
provisions regulating its own authority. It is not difficult to suppose 
that if the majoritarian branches were allowed to act as the final arbi-
823, 827-28 (1988) (quoting Edmond Randolph concerning the "follies of democracy," and El-
dridge Gerry referring to democracy as "the worst of all political evils"); cf Chemerinsky, supra 
note 39, at 65 (footnote omitted) ("The framers' distrust of majoritarian politics is well 
documented."). 
56. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text. 
57. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 109 ("[A] pure democracy ... can admit of 
no cure for the mischiefs of faction."). 
58. Bickel, it should be recalled, ultimately rationalized the exercise of judicial review on the 
ability of the courts to ascertain long-range guiding principles. See supra text accompanying 
notes 31-36. 
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ters of the countermajoritarian constitutional limitations on their au-
thority, there will be no limitations at all, at least as a practical matter. 
This is simply a matter of common sense. Whether one conjures up 
Lord Coke's principle, "Nemo Judex in re sua"59 (no man is to be a 
judge in his own cause), or merely the commonly accepted wisdom 
that one does not rely on the fox to guard the chicken coop, it would 
require the height of naivete to believe that the majoritarian branches 
could, as a general matter, be trusted to sit objectively in final judg-
ment on the constitutionality of their own actions. 
It is, of course, conceivable that one majoritarian branch could be 
placed as the final arbiter of the constitutionality of the actions of the 
other majoritarian branch. In such an event, however, we would still 
be left with a situation in which a simple majority could, as a practical 
matter, effect an amendment of the Constitution. It is not by happen-
stance that, in structuring a largely representational democratic sys-
tem, the framers formally insulated the members of one of the three 
co-equal branches of government from direct majoritarian pressure. It 
should not, then, require tremendous insight to see an inherent link 
between a countermajoritarian governing document, on the one hand, 
and that document's creation of a countermajoritarian branch of gov-
ernment, expressly vested in article III with the authority to adjudi-
cate cases "arising under this Constitution," on the other. 
The obvious problem with this analysis is that the judiciary, as 
much as the other two branches, is itself created, regulated, and con-
trolled by the Constitution. 60 If, as I have argued, it is absurd to sug-
gest that one branch could effectively sit as final arbiter of the 
constitutional provisions governing its conduct, one might reasonably 
ask how the federal judiciary may be allowed to sit as the final arbiter 
of the entire Constitution, including the provisions governing its own 
behavior. 
At most, acceptance of this argument would mean that the judici-
ary should be deprived of its final authority to sit in judgment on its 
own actions; it in no way logically requires that the judicial branch 
cede to the other branches the power to determine the constitutional-
ity of their own actions. Under such a system, Congress and the exec-
utive, through the legislative process, would sit as the final arbiter of 
the limited powers granted to the federal judiciary by article III. 
It is possible, however, to suggest a rationale for reconciling the 
logic of the countermajoritarian principle with the judicial power fi-
nally to resolve the constitutional limits of its own authority. It is well 
established in the law of due process that, despite the enormous impor-
59. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Cong. Rep. 646, 8 Coke 114(a) (1610). See generally Redish & 
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 
455 (1986). 
60. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
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tance of a disinterested and independent adjudicator, existence of an 
overwhelming and compelling interest - bordering on actual neces-
sity - can justify reliance on an adjudicator who is not completely 
neutral. 61 If the majoritarian branches retained' final authority to de-
termine the constitutional contours of the judicial power, those 
branches could easily employ that authority to undermine judicial en-
forcement of the constitutional limitations imposed upon them. When 
one realizes the potentially ominous consequences of entrusting to the 
majoritarian branches final say as to the constitutional limitations on 
the judicial power, then, it is not difficult to find that the vesting of 
such final say in the judicial branch itself rather easily fits within the 
contours of such a "necessity" exception. Thus, the seeming anomaly 
of allowing the judiciary to sit as final judge of its own powers becomes 
not only reasonable but actually essential in an instrumental sense, as 
a means of ensuring the judiciary's effective performance of its central 
role within our political framework. 
The constitutional system we adopted was not handed down from 
on high, nor was it the only form a democratic government could as-
sume. It is, however, the system upon which our whole governmental 
structure has been both established and legitimized. The Constitution 
continues to retain the positivistic force of law; therefore, if the rule of 
law is to be valued, the directives of the Constitution must be obeyed, 
unless and until modified in the manner prescribed in article V, or 
until the system is openly rejected in favor of some new governing 
structure. If the countermajoritarian limitations imposed by the Con-
stitution are to retain meaning, their final interpretation and enforce-
ment must come from the countermajoritarian judicial branch. 
At this point, it is necessary to make clear exactly what arguments 
I am not making in support of the countermajoritarian principle: 
I. I am not arguing that a representational democracy necessar-
ily cannot flourish without either a binding, written, counter-
majoritarian constitution or the practice of judicial review. The point, 
rather, is that a limited constitutional democracy cannot exist without 
a binding, written constitution, as a definitional matter, or without ju-
dicial review by an independent judiciary, as a practical matter. To 
the extent a democracy lacking these features is considered "limited," 
it is only as a result of the good faith and self-imposed limitations of 
both those in political power and a majority of the electorate. 
2. I am not arguing that judicial review is compelled by either the 
text or history of the Constitution. While Herbert Wechsler has at-
tempted to ground a requirement of judicial review in the constitu-
tional text, 62 he has rightly been criticized for this attempt. 63 It is 
61. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-16 (1980). 
62. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3 
(1959) (arguing that judicial review is prescribed by U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
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important to note, however, that while the Constitution's text may not 
compel judicial review, neither is the practice in any way extra- or 
counterconstitutional, as is made clear by article Ill's extensions of the 
federal judicial power to cases arising under the Constitution. 64 More-
over, while there is substantial historical evidence to support the fram-
ers' assumption of the existence of a judicial review power65 - not the 
least of which is Hamilton's direct and eloquent statement in support 
of the concept in The Federalist No. 78 66 - my arguments in no way 
require such a historical foundation. I argue, rather, that to the extent 
the framers did not actually contemplate judicial review, they should 
have, because without it there is no way that the constitutional system 
which they adopted could realistically be expected to function in the 
manner they so obviously intended. Thus, while it might be difficult to 
declare certain attempts by the majoritarian branches to exclude judi-
cial review to be unconstitutional, 67 my argument is merely that the 
concept is dictated by the logic of American political theory, not, at 
least as a general matter, 68 by the text of the Constitution. As such, 
this concept should guide and limit the decisions of the majoritarian 
63. See A. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 49-65. 
64. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
65. See, e.g., R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME COURT (1969); 1 J. GOEBEL, THE 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - ANTECEDENTS AND BEGIN· 
NINGS TO 1801 (1971); 2 G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES - FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 186 
(1981). According to Bickel, "[A]lthough the Framers of the Constitution had failed to be ex-
plicit about the function of judicial review, the evidence of their deliberations demonstrates that 
they foresaw - indeed, invited - it." A. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 15. 
66. Hamilton wrote: 
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited consti-
tution .•.. Limitations [on legislative authority] can be preserved in practice no other way 
than through the medium of courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts 
contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of 
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. 
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, No. 78 (A. Hamilton), at 576-77. 
Hamilton transformed the Constitution's textual silence on the necessity of judicial review 
from a problem into an asset. He did this by shifting the burden of production: 
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own 
powers ... it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not 
to be collected from any particular provisions in the constitution .•.• It is far more rational 
to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and 
the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to 
their authority. 
Id. at 577. 
67. To the extent that majoritarian action deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property, 
however, the exclusion of judicial review could arguably constitute a violation of the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause, by depriving the individual of a constitutionally protected interest 
without a sufficiently independent adjudicator. See Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (holding that Congress did not intend to bar judicial review of constitutional challenges to 
Medicare Act). See generally Redish & Marshall, supra note 59. However, it is generally as-
sumed that such a requirement may be satisfied by the availability of a state-court forum, or 
possibly an administrative process. 
68. See supra note 67. 
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branches to exclude the practice. Moreover, it should prevent the ju-
diciary from erecting self-imposed barriers to the performance of its 
essential political role within the constitutional system. 
3. Nor am I arguing, as have several respected scholars, that the 
concept of judicial review derives from the premise that "[t]he final 
aim of [our constitutional democratic] society is as much freedom as 
possible for the individual human being."69 Such logic has led Dean 
Jesse Choper to urge judicial abstention on issues of both federalism 
and separation of powers in order to preserve the Supreme Court's 
preciously limited "institutional capital" for cases concerning individ-
ual constitutional liberties, where, he argued, performance of the judi-
cial review function is crucial. 70 I in no way intend to derogate the 
vital role played by individual liberty within our political structure. 71 
But the fact remains that nothing in the constitutional text suggests 
that the provisions protecting individual liberty were the only provi-
sions meant to bind the majoritarian branches, while the structural 
provisions, concerning federalism and separation of powers, were in-
tended to be merely advisory. Indeed, when the framers simultane-
ously protected judicial independence and extended power to the 
courts over cases arising under the Constitution, the document in-
cluded precious few protections of individual liberty.72 Most of those 
protections were, of course, added later in the Bill of Rights, which 
amended the original text. Thus, to the extent the constitutional 
structure contemplated judicial review, that power was apparently di-
rected primarily at the very types of constitutional issues Choper 
wishes to exclude from the Court's province. 
If the structural provisions of the Constitution were deemed 
merely advisory, it would be difficult to discern any textual basis for 
finding the provisions protecting individual liberty any less advisory. 
While scholars may argue that individual liberty protections are some-
how more fundamental to our system, the alternative argument could 
be - and has been - made that in reality it is the constitutional pro-
tections of federalism, not those concerning liberty, that are central. 73 
Moreover, it has been persuasively argued that the constitutional dic-
tates concerning separation of powers were themselves fashioned in 
order to prevent tyranny.74 Thus, it is difficult to discover any basis in 
either constitutional text or political theory to justify the distinctions 
69. E. Ros-row, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUES"f 
FOR LAW 149 (1962). 
70. J. CHOPER, supra note 8, at 263, 275. 
71. See generally Redish, supra note 5, at 601-05. 
72. Among the few that did exist were the protection of habeas corpus, U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 2, and the prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, 
cl. 3. 
73. See p. 73. 
74. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983). 
1356 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1340 
in the exercise of judicial review urged by Choper. Most importantly, 
the judiciary's function in our governmental system is to enforce and 
interpret the Constitution, not effectively to repeal provisions it views 
as unwise or outmoded. And there can be little doubt that, by abdicat-
ing its function of reviewing the actions of the majoritarian branches 
to ensure compliance with constitutional dictates, the Court would ef-
fectively repeal the constitutional provision in question; the 
majoritarian branches would be left free to ignore constitutional re-
strictions any time they so desired. 1s 
Ill. NAGEL'S DISREGARD OF THE "COUNTERMAJORITARIAN" 
PRINCIPLE: THE OMINOUS EXAMPLE OF FREE SPEECH 
As already noted, Nagel's analysis of the negative effect of judicial 
review on the attainment of consensus completely ignores the systemic 
costs of a dramatic reduction in the scope and reach of judicial review. 
This disregard is nowhere more evident than in Nagel's analysis of 
judicial review's proper role in free speech cases. 76 
Nagel begins with the unsupported and misleading assumption 
that "[t]he impulse underlying the modern judiciary's energetic efforts 
to enforce the first amendment is the desire to create a tolerant, open 
society" (p. 28). He then concludes that 
[j]udicial review cannot be expected to have any important impact on 
many of the major causes of intolerance and censorship .... Informed 
speculation suggests that a wide range of factors coalesce to determine 
the amount of tolerance or intolerance .... Adjudication is an unlikely 
mechanism for controlling such large and complex factors. [p. 29] 
Thus, by conclusorily assuming the validity of only one rationale for 
the protection of free speech - one that has been advocated as the 
sole justification for free speech by only one scholar77 and is sorely 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60. 
76. At the outset, it should be noted that while Nagel vigorously attacks the role of judicial 
review in free speech cases, see infra text accompanying notes 90-99, he emphasizes that he does 
"not ..• intend to suggest that the courts can never have an important role to play" in free 
speech cases. P. 59. But at no point does he describe the "rare occasions" (p. 59) on which they 
may do so in any detail. In a footnote, he suggests that "an insightful analysis that comes to a 
somewhat similar conclusion" appears in Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First 
Amendment, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 449 (1985). P. 183 n.170. However, Nagel is much too modest 
in his willingness to share the credit for his suggested dramatic reduction of the judicial role in 
free speech cases, for Nagel's version of that role is dramatically narrower than Blasi's version. 
Blasi's rationale in structuring his first amendment scope is the belief that "adjudication in ordi-
nary times should be heavily influenced by the goal of strengthening the central norms of the first 
amendment tradition against the possibility of pathological challenges," the label which he np-
plies to times of great political stress. Blasi, supra, at 458. See generally Redish, The Role of 
Pathology in First Amendment Theory: A Skeptical Examination, 38 CASE W. R.Es. L. REV. 618 
(1987-88). Nagel, in sharp contrast, dismisses the notion that judicial enforcement of the first 
amendment should play any significant role in such times. See infra text accompanying notes -
-. Thus, Blasi's suggested judicial role is dramatically broader than that urged by Nagel. 
77. L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986). Nagel attributes this theory to Justice 
Holmes' famed dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J,, 
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misguided in any event78 - Nagel is able to complete his self-serving 
proof. However, had he acknowledged the primacy of any of the 
many other conceivable rationales for free speech - facilitation of the 
political process, 79 individual self-realization, 80 or the development of 
a marketplace of ideas81 - his conclusion would not necessarily have 
followed. 
It is puzzling to see Nagel question the assertion "that adjudication 
can ... be expected to protect the free exchange of ideas significantly" 
{p. 30).. One need only look to the Court's decisions in the areas of 
defamation of public figures82 or the opening of the "public forum" to 
free and open debate83 to see how much the Court has done to ensure 
and encourage "the free exchange of ideas." Moreover, while the 
Court's record on the regulation of obscenity leaves much to be de-
sired from a protectionist perspective, 84 the fact remains that the 
Court has at least curbed governmental censorship excesses in the ex-
treme case. 85 And while most of the Court's early decisions concern-
ing regulation of the advocacy of unlawful conduct could hardly be 
described as protectionist, 86 at least its most influential modem state-
ment on the issue assures that the free exchange of ideas may be 
curbed only in the presence of a real and immediate danger. 87 Thus, 
in what represents a disturbing pattern throughout much of his 
dissenting), in which Holmes referred to the need for a "free trade in ideas" and rationalized free 
speech protection by an analogy to the capitalistic marketplace. 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting); see p. 28. But while any protectionist theory of free speech will of course require 
tolerance in the purely consequential sense (since the absence of such tolerance would mean 
suppression), such "tolerance" is relevant to Holmes only in this instrumental manner. No free 
speech theorist, other than Bollinger, has rationalized free speech protection solely or primarily 
as a means of developing tolerant attitudes in society. 
78. The idea that the goal of free speech protection, adopted as a means of fostering free 
thought and individual intellectual integrity, should be perverted into nothing more than a means 
of governmental development of the equivalent of mind control, by fostering among the populace 
a uniform and unwavering attitude of tolerance, borders on the Orwellian. 
79. See, e.g .• A. MEIKLEIOHN, PoLmCAL FREEDOM (1960); Bork, Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
80. See, e.g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 
(1978); Redish, supra note 5; Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
204 (1972). 
81. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); J. MILL, 
ON LIBERTY (1859). 
82. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 
374 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
83. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15 (1971); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
84. See Redish, supra note 5, at 635-40. 
85. For example, in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), the Court overturned the ob-
scenity conviction of a movie theater manager for showing the movie Carnal Knowledge. 
86. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
87. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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book, 88 Nagel builds his theories on an empirically questionable 
foundation. 89 
Once again, however, the most troubling aspect of Nagel's analysis 
is his disregard of the central role which an independent judiciary 
must serve as a check on majoritarian instincts. For example, he criti-
cizes Thomas Emerson for "portray[ing] the courts as a wall standing 
against the floor of repression," because Emerson "failed to provide a 
single example of the destruction of a whole system of free expression 
after the imposition of a few limitations upon discussion .... "90 In 
support, Nagel notes that "even systematic waves of suppression often 
vanish suddenly, jarring the democratic system but not destroying it" 
(p. 36). But should that be the test for determining the need for judi-
cial protection of free speech? Should we be satisfied with the exist-
ence of widespread suppression of ideas and opinions, so long as the 
nation has not yet been consumed by a totalitarian structure as a re-
sult? Should we willingly suffer periods of widespread suppression, 
because we can rest assured that ultimately, they will "vanish" with-
out judicial help? It is difficult to respond to Nagel's arguments here, 
because the value he places on the importance of a free or open society 
is apparently so much lower than the value that I (and, I believe, our 
constitutional system) place on it. 
Nagel accurately notes that, on a purely descriptive level, "none of 
our most serious periods of repression was influenced significantly by 
judicial enforcement of the first amendment, yet each ended well short 
of destroying the system of free expression" (p. 37). But, as already 
noted, serious harm to the values of free speech may be - and clearly 
were - caused well short of a total destruction of the system. In any 
event, the question remains: Why should we be willing to suffer even 
the harms to free speech that Nagel acknowledges actually did occur? 
Could it be because such judicial action would have undermined at-
tainment of some sort of prevailing social consensus? 91 The very point 
of free speech protection is that such a consensus is unnecessary. 
Could it be because by invalidating majoritarian suppression the un-
representative judiciary will be undermining democratic values? 92 
Such an analysis ignores the important countermajoritarian limitation 
inherent in our constitutional form of democracy.93 Moreover, such a 
short-sighted view of democratic theory would ultimately lead us 
88. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
89. In a classic illustration of a pot calling the kettle black, Nagel criticizes Professor 
Thomas Emerson, whose free speech theory was set out in T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE· 
DOM OF EXPRESSION (1970), for "support[ing] [his] conclusion with a series of unexamined as-
sertions regarding the utility of judicial review .•.. " P. 32. 
90. P. 35 (discussing T. EMERSON, supra note 89). 
91. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30. 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33. 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 31-75. 
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down the road toward the undermining, if not the total destruction, of 
that democratic system.94 
Much of Nagel's attack on the role of judicial review in free speech 
cases focuses on the argument that such judicial involvement may ac-
tually be "dysfunctional" (p. 28), or in other words, counterproductive 
to the advancement of free speech values. In fashioning this argu-
ment, he begins with the factual assumption that "[t]he modem first 
amendment consensus holds at least to some degree that 'expression 
must be protected against governmental curtailment at all points, even 
where the results of expression may appear to be in conflict with other 
social interests that the government is charged with safeguarding.' " 95 
He contends that "the habit of intellectual discipline so necessary to 
the impartial application of the law is asserted to be the judiciary's 
major qualification for its present role" (p. 39). He then concludes 
that "[t]he difficulty is that, by definition, the use of principle requires 
courts to protect speech even in cases in which the immediate advan-
tages are questionable and the social disadvantages are clear" (p. 39). 
He finally suggests that "[t]he judiciary implicitly acknowledges the 
dangers of principled decisions by creating exceptions" (p. 39), and 
rhetorically asks, "Is public acceptance and respect for the first 
amendment increased or decreased by the constant message sent out 
by principled adjudication?" (p. 39). 
The fallacies in Nagel's logic are many. First, his argument that 
the Court ultimately undermines its credibility by beginning with an 
assumption of absolutism while simultaneously recognizing individual 
exceptions assumes factually inaccurate premises. Certainly, a major-
ity of the Justices has never begun with the premise that free speech is 
to take precedence over all conceivable competing values.96 Indeed, 
not even most scholars who could reasonably be described as protec-
tionist fit that description.97 Second, Nagel incorrectly assumes that 
the primary justification for the judicial role in free speech cases is the 
judiciary's adherence to principled adjudication. In fact, it is the judi-
ciary's independence from both the majoritarian branches and the 
populace that justifies its role in free speech cases, under the logic of 
the countermajoritarian principle.98 The courts' ultimate judgments 
may often be nothing more than the outcome of a balancing of com-
94. See supra note 40. 
95. P. 38 (quoting T. EMERSON, supra note 89, at 17). 
96. Justices Black and Douglas were the only members of the Court who have at any point 
purported to adhere to such an absolutist position. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 
36 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Douglas). 
97. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 792 (2d ed. 1988); Ely, Flag 
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment 
Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE 
L.J. 1424 (1962). 
98. See supra text accompanying notes 56-75. 
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peting social interests.99 The key, however, is that the balance is 
struck by a governmental organ formally insulated from the very pres-
sures which have given rise to the suppression in the first place. 
IV. INTELLECTUAL CONSISTENCY VERSUS IDEOLOGICAL REsULT-
0RIENTATION: NAGEL ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
FEDERALISM 
As troubling as one may _find Nagel's attitude toward the judicial 
role in free speech cases, one might at least reasonably expect that 
Nagel would apply his theory of extreme judicial deference consist-
ently to all questions of constitutional interpretation. Nagel's analysis 
of the judicial role in issues of constitutional federalism refutes that 
expectation. 
As already noted, early in the 1980s, Choper advanced the contro-
versial theory that judicial review should be reserved solely for issues 
of individual liberty .100 He feared that expenditure of preciously lim-
ited judicial "capital" on issues· offederalism and separation of powers 
would endanger the Court's ability to gain public acceptance for its 
potentially unpopular decisions protecting individual rights, and sug-
gested that the constitutional interests of federalism and separation of 
powers did not require judicial protection in order to thrive. 101 Other 
scholars who generally favor an "activist" judiciary followed suit. 102 I 
have criticized Choper's logic, 103 and suggested that acceptance of his 
theory would amount to the Court's improperly picking and choosing 
which constitutional provisions it would enforce on the basis of stark 
political or ideological preferences.104 Nagel also rejects attempts by 
the Court to abdicate the judicial review function in federalism 
cases. 105 However, the differences between his position on the issue 
and my own are striking. 
Of initial importance is the fact that, while I rationalize the need 
for meaningful judicial enforcement of the precepts of constitutional 
federalism, on the basis of an attempt to avoid selective enforcement 
driven by a naked ideological result-orientation by the judiciary, t06 
Nagel's urging of a highly activist judiciary in this one area is puz-
zlingly inconsistent with the philosophy of extreme deference he urges 
99. See M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRIDCAL ANALYSIS 119-20 (1984). 
100. J. CHOPER, supra note 8. 
101. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75. 
102. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 37-60. 
103. See Redish & Drizin, supra note 9, at 34-41. 
104. Id. at 40. 
105. P. 61. Nagel criticizes, for example, the Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that state interests are more properly pro-
tected by procedural limitations inherent in the federal system than by substantive limits on 
federal power). 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04. 
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in every other area of constitutional law .107 In criticizing "the modern 
Court's record of enforcing the principle of federalism" as "anemic" 
(p. 60), Nagel characterizes such a development as "one aspect of a 
widespread pattern that inverts the priorities of the framers: an obses-
sive concern for using the Constitution to protect individuals' rights" 
(p. 61). The effect of such an inversion, he contends, is "ultimately to 
trivialize the Constitution," because "[t]he framers' political theory 
was immediately concerned with organization, not individuals" (p. 
64). In choosing to focus on individuals rather than federalism, he 
argues, "modern judges and scholars have tended to shut themselves 
off from full participation in the great debates about governmental the-
ory begun by the framers" (p. 65). 
Such an analysis appears to ignore everything Nagel had said until 
that point about the judicial role in constitutional adjudication. Prior 
to his discussion of constitutional federalism, his criticisms of judicial 
activism had focused upon the supposedly negative impact that judi-
cial constitutional interpretation has on attainment of political, social, 
and linguistic consensus.108 Ironically, something approaching just 
such a national consensus appeared to have developed prior to the 
Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 109 which as-
serted, for the first time in many years, 110 a significant judicial role in 
the resolution of issues of constitutional federalism. Yet the bulk of 
Nagel's commentary on the subject provides a defense of Usery (pp. 
68-83), notwithstanding that decision's arguably disruptive impact on 
national consensus. One would think that if attainment of national 
consensus on constitutional issues were deemed the primary goal - a 
conclusion which, I should emphasize, I categorically reject, 111 but 
one which Nagel appears to adopt112 - one should logically decry 
Usery for rocking the consensual boat. However, in discussing the 
Court's role in issues of constitutional federalism, Nagel appears to 
have forgotten his entire "consensus" analysis. Instead, without citing 
anything approaching dispositive historical evidence as to the framers' 
understanding, 113 and without ever explaining why their understand-
107. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05. 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 15-30. 
109. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
110. For many years, the Court had employed an extremely deferential approach to federal 
regulation of matters that had previously been considered to be exclusively within the domain of 
the states. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that federal marketing 
quotas on wheat not intended for commerce fall within commerce power); United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that maximum-hours and minimum-wage provision for 
goods intended for commerce fall within the commerce power). 
111. See supra text accompanying notes 17-30. 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
113. To suggest, as Nagel does, that "[t]he framers' political theory was immediately con-
cerned with organization, not individuals" (p. 64) is at best misleading. What the framers of the 
original body of the Constitution wished tells only a part of the story, since the bulk of the 
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ing should today be deemed controlling in any event, 114 he asserts that 
judges should seek to participate "in the great debates about govern-
mental theory begun by the framers" {p. 65). 
The problem, of course, is that unlike scholars, judges do not 
merely "participate in debates" about governmental theory. 115 
Rather, they consider such issues of governmental theory only as a 
prelude to possibly invalidating actions of the majoritarian branches. 
And it is recognition of this fact that renders Nagel's defense of Usery 
so strikingly inconsistent with his theory of judicial restraint. 
The problems with Nagel's defense of Usery go considerably be-
yond the simple fact of inconsistency with his underlying theory of 
judicial review. While the federal judiciary's independence from 
majoritarian political pressures dictates a judicial obligation to enforce 
the provisions of the countermajoritarian Constitution, 116 the same 
fact simultaneously dictates a judicial inability to overrule policy 
choices of the majoritarian branches that do not violate some constitu-
tional provision. For absent a reasonable grounding in the text of the 
Constitution, the unrepresentative judiciary lacks any source of legiti-
Constitution's individual rights protections came in the Bill of Rights, added only after adoption 
of the original Constitution. Thus, the views of the original framers about the importance of 
individual rights are largely irrelevant to a determination of the importance that the nation in-
tended to place on the individual rights protections in the Bill of Rights. If anything, the fact 
that its adoption was demanded by state ratifiers tends to demonstrate its enormous importance 
to many. Moreover, many of today's individual rights protections are derived from the limits 
imposed on state governments in the fourteenth amendment, adopted many decades after the 
first set of framers drafted the original Constitution. 
There also exists both a logical and historical basis for questioning the artificially formal 
distinction Nagel draws between "organization" and "individuals." The two are not mutually 
exclusive. Contemporary sources indicate that for the most part, the particular governmental 
organization was chosen for the very purpose of assuring that individuals would remain free from 
tyranny. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957 (1983) (contending that separation-of-powers 
provisions "were intended to ... protect the people from the improvident exercise of power"). 
To be sure, Nagel's argument does assist in refuting those who argue for an exclusive modem 
focus on individual rights protections, at the expense of the structural provisions. Cf Redish & 
Drizin, supra note 9, at 35 (footnotes omitted): 
[W]hen the framers simultaneously protected judicial independence and extended power 
over cases arising under the Constitution, the Constitution included precious few protec-
tions of individual liberty .... Thus, to the extent the constitutional structure contemplated 
judicial review, that power was apparently directed primarily at the very types of constitu-
tional issues Dean Choper wishes to exclude from the Court's province. 
But it does not follow that there should be a total reversal of the current hierarchy, as Nagel 
desires. 
114. There has long been a spirited academic debate over the extent to which the framers' 
original understanding should bind modem constitutional interpretation. Compare Bennett, Ob-
jectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 445 (1984) and Brest, supra note 1 with 
Monaghan, supra note 3 and Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition and Reason: A Theory of 
Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985). 
115. Cf Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (reasoning that the requirement of actual injury to make out 
standing to bring suit "tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be 
resolved [in a forum that is] not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society"). 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 31-75. 
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mate authority to contradict legislative choices in a basically demo-
cratic society. If representational democratic theory means anything, 
it means this much. 
In light of this dictate of American political theory, Usery clearly 
constitutes an illegitimate judicial usurpation of legislative authority. 
That decision established a constitutional enclave of state governmen-
tal authority, protected from federal intrusion, even where article I, 
section 8 of the Constitution is normally construed to vest such regula-
tory authority in Congress.117 Yet the only conceivable textual source 
for such an enclave is the tenth amendment, 118 which by its terms 
protects states from federal intrusion only when article I fails to au-
thorize congressional power.119 Thus, Usery imposed limitations on 
federal legislative power solely on the basis of an ideology premised on 
the political values of federalism. It is difficult to conceive of a more 
illegitimate exercise of judicial activism. 
Ironically, then, in the one area in which something akin to the 
judicial deference urged by Nagel throughout his book might actually 
be appropriate, 120 he ignores not only his own flawed rationale for 
such deference, 121 but also the limited relevance of constitutional lan-
guage. Thus, Nagel effectively deprives his theory of what would have 
been its only saving grace, its intellectual consistency. 
V. THE STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL FORMULAE 
Undoubtedly the most forceful portion of Nagel's analysis is his 
critique of what he labels the "formulaic Constitution" (p. 121). He 
contends here that "a new style of opinion writing [has] emerged," 
which "emphasizes carefully framed doctrine expressed in elaborately 
layered sets of 'tests,' 'prongs,' 'requirements,' 'standards,' or 'hur-
dles'" (p. 121). He correctly perceives that this style is part of a 
"modem effort to combine realism and formalism" (p. 131 ), but criti-
cizes it for achieving "a specious definiteness" (p. 142), for 
"analyz[ing] endlessly" (p. 129), and for "objectify[ing] ideas" (p. 
129). 
To a limited extent, Nagel's criticism is well taken. There can be 
little doubt that constitutional formulae "often create[] a specious 
sense of certainty" that "promise[s] clarity or measurement where 
only judgment is possible" (p. 139). In the free speech area, for exam-
117. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 836, 842-43 (1976). 
· 118. See U.S. CoNST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people." 
119. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 701-02 (1974); Redish 
& Drizin, supra note 9, at 10-12. 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 15-30. 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 15-30. 
1364 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1340 
ple, both the Court and commentators have often sought a simplicity 
of analysis which fails to comport with the real complexities of the 
individual case. 122 It does not follow, however, that we should accept 
Nagel's criticism that "much of the Justices' intellectual energy is not 
directed at the actual resolution of cases at hand [but is instead] di-
rected at the difficult, complex, but preliminary issue of determining 
the proper test to be applied in a defined class of cases" (p. 148). We 
must keep in mind that Supreme Court decision making is unique. 
The Court does not select for resolution so few cases among the many 
presented for review, merely to resolve the case at hand. Rather, the 
cases are generally chosen for the very purpose "of determining the 
proper test to be applied· in a defined class of cases." Surely, the Court 
would not be put to its highest and best use if it were confined to 
resolving cases in a manner similar to television's Judge Wapner, with-
out regard to how future cases might be affected by the decision. 
Nagel argues that 
neither the content nor the shape of modem formulae communicates 
clarity and constraint. The formulae are demands - multiple, repeti-
tive, shifting, and sometimes inconsistent. The style reflects intellectual 
embarrassment about the existence of judicial discretion, but is designed 
to assume plentiful opportunities for its exercise .... Rather than bind-
ing, the formulaic style frees the Court, like some lumbering bully, to 
disrupt social norms and practices at its pleasure. [p. 157] 
While Nagel's criticism is no doubt applicable to a number of the 
Court's constitutional formulae - not the least of which is the Usery 
doctrine, of which Nagel is so enamored123 - it is by no means clear 
that the fault is in any way inherent in the use of a formulaic style. 
There are good constitutional formulae, and there are bad constitu-
tional formulae. But because Nagel focuses his attack on the very in-
stitution of the constitutional formula, he neglects to provide useful 
criteria by which to measure the validity of individual formulae. 
Even if Nagel were correct in his criticism of the use of constitu-
tional formulae, he has failed to suggest even a single reasonable alter-
native mode of constitutional analysis. Presumably, the only 
conceivable alternatives to the formulaic style are either a totally fact-
based, subjective, case-by-case analysis, or some sort of a direct appli-
cation of constitutional text to specific fact situations. Of course, 
neither of these alternatives provides a feasible method of constitu-
tional decision making. Indeed, it is the first alternative, rather than 
the formulaic style, that gives rise to the dangers of unprincipled judi-
cial "bullying."124 The second alternative, on the other hand, would, 
122. For a more complete examination of the point, see generally Redish, The Warren Court, 
the Burger Court, and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031 
(1983). 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14. 
124. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23. 
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in most cases, be absurdly unrealistic. 
Recognition of the proper rationale for judicial review 125 actually 
dictates the Supreme Court's use of constitutional formulae. While it 
would be naive to believe that the ideology of individual Justices must 
play no role in constitutional decision making, fundamental precepts 
of democratic theory prescribe that the Court approach its constitu-
tional decisions in a manner qualitatively different from the manner in 
which a legislature decides issues of social policy. The Court's deci-
sions must be reasonably grounded in constitutional text, must provide 
workable, P,redictable, and "generalizable" standards for future courts 
to follow, and must avoid inconsistent or unprincipled decision mak-
ing. It is difficult to imagine how these ends could be achieved, absent 
the use of some form of constitutional formulae. To be sure, the Court 
has often adopted specific formulae that fail to meet one or more of 
these criteria. But Professor Nagel's frontal assault on the Court's use 
of constitutional formulae per se is both misguided from the perspec-
tive of constitutional democratic theory and counter-productive as a 
mode of constructive constitutional criticism. 
CONCLUSION 
Any advocate of judicial activism today has to recognize Robert Nagel 
as a formidable adversary. Nevertheless, one can find major flaws in 
his analysis. Nagel's theoretical framework places undue emphasis on 
the need to attain social consensus, fails to come to terms with the 
logical and historical rationales for judicial review within a constitu-
tional democratic system, and ignores the serious systemic harm 
caused by majoritarian suppression of fundamental constitutional 
rights. Moreover, by mounting a puzzling and unjustified attack on 
the generic use of constitutional formulae without providing a hint of 
what should replace them, Nagel squanders an opportunity to make a 
valuable contribution by exploring the criteria by which specific for-
mulae might be measured. Thus, despite Nagel's obvious talents as a 
constitutional scholar, one leaves his book with a good deal less than 
complete satisfaction. 
125. See supra text accompanying notes 31-75. 
